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This paper examines how unemployment affects retirement and whether the Unemployment Insurance
(UI) system and Social Security (SS) system affect how older workers respond to labor market shocks.
 To do so, we use pooled cross-sectional data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) as
well as March CPS files matched between one year and the next and longitudinal data from the Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS).  We find that downturns in the labor market increase retirement transitions.
 The magnitude of this effect is comparable to that associated with moderate changes in financial incentives
to retire and to the threat of a health shock to which older workers are exposed.  Interestingly, retirements
only increase in response to an economic downturn once workers become SS-eligible, suggesting that
retirement benefits may help alleviate the income loss associated with a weak labor market.  We also
estimate the impact of UI generosity on retirement and find little consistent evidence of an effect. 
This suggests that in some ways SS may serve as a more effective form of unemployment insurance
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Job loss is an empirically important phenomenon for older workers.  Between 2001 and 
2003,  more  than  10  percent  of  workers  aged  55-64  experienced  job  loss  (Farber,  2005).  
Moreover,  job  loss  has  significant  long-term  effects  on  employment  and  wages  for  older 
workers.  Chan and Stevens (1999) estimate that the employment rate of displaced older workers 
two  years  after  a  job  loss  is  25  percentage  points  lower  than  that  of  similar  non-displaced 
workers and that the median reemployed worker earns 20 percent less than at his previous job.   
Given that older workers face a considerable risk of job loss and difficulty finding an 
equivalent job afterwards, labor market conditions may affect workers’ retirement decisions.
1  
This link has largely been overlooked in the extensive previous literature on retirement, which 
focuses primarily on the role of poor health and financial incentives.  Just as health status can act 
as  an  important  constraint  limiting  continued  work  at  older  ages,  so  too  may  labor  market 
conditions be a critical constraint for older workers.  If older workers lose their jobs, they may 
have difficulty finding suitable employment and decide to retire, particularly during periods of 
economic downturn.
2   
Not  only  is  the  link  between  labor  market  conditions  and  retirement  relevant  for 
understanding retirement behavior, it is also important because of the interactions with public 
sector programs.  Just as a health shock may bring about unanticipated retirement and income 
                                                 
1 Although we are presuming that retirements may increase (similar to a “discouraged worker effect” – DWE), it is 
also possible that retirements may decrease.  This could happen if the threat of job loss for one individual leads his 
or her spouse to remain in the labor market beyond the point when they may choose to retire.  This is similar to the 
notion of “added worker effect” (AWE).  Empirical evidence for the AWE is mixed; see, for example, Lundberg 
(1985) and Speltzer (1997). Our estimates can be thought of as measuring the net effect of unemployment on 
retirement, incorporating both the DWE and AWE.  
 
2 Workers may also choose to retire in the face of an economic downturn if their wages are cut even if they do not 
lose their jobs.  This possibility seems unlikely, however, given past research on the cyclicality of real wages.  Given 
the nature of the estimated responsiveness of wages to the business cycle among workers who stay on their job 
(Devereaux, 2001), the retirement elasticity with respect to the wage would have to be enormous to generate a 
significant retirement response.   2 
insecurity that can be alleviated by government programs, unemployment associated with an 
economic downturn may have similar implications.  The Unemployment Insurance (UI) system 
is designed to help protect workers, including older ones, from the income loss associated with 
unemployment.    For  older  workers,  UI  may  provide  the  resources  necessary  to  weather  the 
storm, offering a bridge towards retirement.  At the very least, it may allow workers to delay the 
take-up of retirement benefits for the period that UI benefits are available.  It may also enable 
them to stay in the labor market long enough to find new work, which may more substantially 
delay retirement and benefit claiming. 
Social Security (SS) offers another form of income that can help overcome earnings loss.  
While SS is traditionally thought of as a source of support for retired and disabled workers, it 
may serve as an additional source of support for older workers who lose their jobs.  If an older 
unemployed worker is struggling financially, he may be forced to start collecting SS benefits to 
make ends meet.  Although one does not necessarily need to retire to collect these benefits, 
benefit receipt is typically linked to retirement (Coile, et al. 2002).  In terms of providing income 
support  to  older  unemployed  workers,  SS  may  be  thought  of  as  an  alternative  form  of 
unemployment insurance.
3   
In this paper, we explore the role of labor market conditions in retirement transitions and 
the extent to which the UI and SS programs affect workers’ response to labor market shocks. 
Specifically, we will address the following questions:  (1) Are retirement transitions cyclically 
sensitive?  (2) Do more generous UI benefits reduce the likelihood of retirement transitions?  (3) 
Do SS provisions interact with labor market conditions in affecting retirement transitions?  In our 
analysis, we use pooled cross-sections of data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) 
                                                 
3 Indeed, Hutchens (1999) suggests that employers may view it as such when making layoffs or offering early 
retirement windows.  Under the implicit contract model he develops, there will be an inefficiently high level of early 
retirement due to the lack of experience rating in Social Security.     3 
data for over twenty years, as well as March CPS files matched between one year and the next 
and longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). 
We have several principal findings.  First, we find that the unemployment rate has a 
positive and significant effect on retirement transitions: an increase in the unemployment rate of 
3 percentage points, which corresponds roughly from moving from the peak of an expansion to 
the trough of a recession, raises the retirement hazard for workers aged 55-69 by 5 to 10 percent.  
The magnitude of this effect is comparable to that associated with moderate changes in financial 
incentives to retire  and  to the threat of a health shock to which older  workers  are  exposed.  
Second, this effect is evident only when workers hit age 62, suggesting that access to SS benefits 
may lead unemployed older workers to retire in order to gain that source of income.  Third, we 
find  little  consistent  evidence  indicating  that  more  generous  UI  benefits  alter  retirement 
transitions,  suggesting  that  the  UI  system  plays  only  a  minor  role  at  best  in  assisting  older 
workers who lose their jobs to delay retirement.  Taken together, these findings suggest that the 
SS system may play a bigger role in helping older workers cope with job loss than the UI system. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Institutional Features of UI and SS 
We begin with a brief discussion of the institutional features of UI and SS that are most 
pertinent for our analysis.  The UI system is administered at the state level with federal oversight.  
As such, there is a good deal of variation in specific provisions across states, although the basic 
framework  of  the  program  is  the  same.    That  framework  includes  two  types  of  eligibility 
requirements.  Workers satisfy “non-monetary eligibility” if they lose a job through no fault of 
their own and demonstrate that they are actively looking for work.  Workers meet “monetary   4 
eligibility” requirements if they had a sufficient work history prior to job loss.  In terms of 
benefits, individuals typically receive an amount equal to half of their pre-unemployment weekly 
wage, subject to a minimum and maximum benefit.  Since the minimum benefit is typically very 
low, the major source of state variability in the generosity of UI benefits is the maximum weekly 
benefit.  Some states are considerably more generous than others, both in benefit levels and ease 
of meeting monetary eligibility requirements.
4  On average, UI benefits replace approximately 35 
percent of lost earnings (U.S. Department of Labor, 2006).  Weekly benefits are available for a 
limited  duration,  typically  26  weeks.    During  a  recession,  however,  this  maximum  benefit 
duration is often extended to a longer time period.  
SS  benefits  are  available  to  covered  workers  (those  with  at  least  ten  years  of  work 
experience) starting at age 62.  SS benefits are calculated by applying a progressive benefit 
formula to the worker’s average indexed earnings over his best 35 years. The basic monthly 
benefit amount is then adjusted depending on the age of benefit claim; the adjustment factor is 
set to be roughly actuarially fair, so that the present discounted value of the stream of benefits 
received  over  the  worker’s  lifetime  for  an  average  worker  will  be  approximately  the  same 
regardless of the age at which he or she claims.  A typical newly retired worker receives a benefit 
of about $1,000 per month, which equates to a 42 percent replacement rate relative to career 
average  earnings  (Social  Security  Administration,  2005a  and  2005b).  Finally,  since  1980, 
covered workers have not been allowed to claim UI and SS benefits simultaneously, although 
they may claim these benefits sequentially (Hutchens and Jacobson, 2002). 
                                                 
4 In 2004, maximum weekly benefits ranged from $210 in Alabama and Mississippi to $508 in Massachusetts.  
Minimum earnings requirements to be eligible for UI ranged from $130 in the past year in Hawaii to $3,520 in Ohio 
in that year.  See Levine (forthcoming) for a complete list of maximum weekly benefit amounts and annual earnings 
requirements  by  state  for  2004.    For  all  years,  data  on  benefit  levels  and  eligibility  rules  are  obtained  from:  
Highlights  of  State  Unemployment  Compensation  Laws  (various  issues),  Comparison  of  State  Unemployment 
Insurance  Laws,  (various  issues),  and  Significant  Provisions  of  State  Unemployment  Insurance  Laws  (various 
issues). 
   5 
B. Previous Literature 
Although little past research has examined the role that unemployment and UI play in 
retirement decisions in the U.S., related research on the impact of job loss among older workers 
and the role of unemployment and UI in retirement transitions in other countries does inform our 
discussion.
5  The broader literatures that address the determinants of retirement and the role of 
UI in labor markets are also relevant.  We briefly review these past lines of research here. 
As discussed in the introduction, work by Farber (2005) and Chan and Stevens (1999, 
2001) has established that job loss among older workers is reasonably common and has long-
lasting negative effects on the future employment prospects and earnings of these workers.  Chan 
and  Stevens  (2004)  look  at  the  effect  of  job  loss  on  retirement  –  specifically,  they  explore 
whether the lower wages and lost opportunity to accrue additional pension benefits than often 
follow job loss affect the retirement decision.  They find that these are not major contributors to 
retirement,  leading  them  to  conclude  that  “other  barriers  to  reemployment  may  be  more 
important explanations for the low employment rates of recently displaced older workers.”  Our 
work addresses a related but distinct question, in that we look at whether retirement is cyclically 
sensitive rather than the effect of job loss on individual workers.  Moreover, if “other barriers” 
such as difficulty in finding new employment at older ages explain why older job losers are so 
much less likely to be employed than other older workers, then UI may play a key role in helping 
workers to overcome these barriers.  This is the second focus of our study.   
                                                 
5 Rebick (1994) uses time-series evidence for the U.S., Sweden, and Japan to look at the effect of unemployment on 
the labor force participation rate and rate of Social Security benefit receipt for older workers.  This study is subject 
to the usual critique that it may be difficult to separate causal effects from spurious correlations between trending 
variables, particularly given the significant changes in U.S. labor force participation since 1950.  Hamermesh (1980) 
makes an early contribution to the literature by examining the effect of UI receipt and UI income on retirement for a 
sample of workers from the Retirement History Survey.  This differs considerably from our empirical strategy, 
described in more detail below, of using state-level UI policies to identify the effects of UI on retirement.       6 
  Despite the lack of research on this in the U.S., analysts from other developed nations 
have explored these issues.  Hallberg (2006) finds that the probability that a worker takes early 
retirement in Sweden is affected by deviations in aggregate employment in his industry from the 
long-run  trend.    Other  researchers  have  shown  that  many  workers’  pathway  to  retirement 
includes a period of time spent on UI prior to claiming Social Security benefits.  This is the case 
for 7 percent of older workers in Sweden (Palme and Svensson, 2004), 15 percent in Belgium 
(Dellis et. al., 2004), over 20 percent in France and Germany (Mathieu and Blanchet, 2004; 
Borsch-Supan et. al., 2004), and nearly 40 percent in Japan (Oshio and Oishi, 2004).  
   Although little past work has examined the role of UI in retirement transitions, significant 
bodies of work have examined retirement and UI separately.
6  One large branch of the retirement 
literature  has  focused  on  the  role  of  financial  incentives  from  Social  Security  and  private 
pensions, programs which may lead workers to retire earlier if they raise lifetime wealth or later 
if they are structured such that lifetime benefits rise with continued work (Stock and Wise, 1990; 
Coile and Gruber, forthcoming).  Another major branch of the literature has highlighted the 
important role of health status (Baker et. al., 2004; Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999) and access to 
health insurance (Blau and Gilleskie, 2001; Gruber and Madrian, 1995).  All these factors have 
been found to be important determinants of retirement transitions. 
  Other research has focused on the role that the UI system plays in determining labor 
market  outcomes  more  generally.    Perhaps  the  most  researched  question  is  the  relationship 
between the generosity of the UI system and the duration of unemployment spells.  Economic 
theory predicts that if individuals receive UI payments while unemployed, then they have less 
                                                 
6 Hutchens and Jacobson (2002) present a contribution to a related question.  They examine the age patterns of UI 
receipt before and after the law change that prevented workers from collecting both UI and SS at the same time.    
They find that prior to the law change, there were substantial spikes in rates of UI receipt exactly at ages 62 and 65, 
suggesting that claims for UI were filed along with initial filings for SS.  These spikes dissipated in the years 
following the law change.     7 
incentive to find another job and may remain unemployed longer.  Indeed, this may be optimal if 
it  leads  to  better  job  matches  (c.f.  Mortensen,  1986).    Empirical  evidence  supports  this 
prediction, finding that a 10 percent increase in UI benefits leads to a 5 percent increase in 
unemployment spell lengths (Krueger and Meyer, 2002).  Although this work has not focused on 
older workers specifically, they too may respond by remaining unemployed longer.  Further, for 
older workers additional job search may also mean prolonging labor force participation before 
retiring and starting receipt of retirement benefits.  Past research has not examined this issue.  A 
sizable literature examining the determinants of UI take-up rates exists as well (Anderson and 
Meyer, 1997), but this literature similarly does not distinguish between the behavior of younger 
and older workers.  
 
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
We use several data sources for this project.  The use of multiple sources is advantageous 
because each source provides alternative ways to measure retirement,
7 the exact definition of 
which is somewhat ambiguous, and offers different strengths and weaknesses.
8  If we obtain 
consistent findings across data sources, we will be able to draw stronger conclusions regarding 
the relationship between unemployment, government programs, and retirement.   
                                                 
7 In our analysis, we follow the previous literature and treat retirement as an absorbing state, ignoring the possibility 
of labor force re-entry.  The March CPS does not allow us to identify re-entrants due to the short period over which 
we observe labor force behavior.  In the matched March CPS, however, we are able to exclude labor force exits that 
are followed by rapid re-entry.  Only the HRS follows individuals for long enough to allow us to identify long-term 
labor force re-entry.  A full analysis of labor force re-entry is beyond the scope of this project, but analyzing the 
effect of unemployment and UI on re-entry and the use of bridge jobs may be a fruitful area for future research. 
 
8 Several differences emerge from our detailed discussion of these data sources below.   Our matched March CPS 
sample is smaller than that from the regular March CPS, but the matched CPS allows us to restrict the sample to 
individuals with greater labor force attachment and provides us with more time to observe transitions from work to 
unemployment and/or UI receipt to eventual retirement.  While the HRS offers us an opportunity to follow people for 
an even longer period of time, unfortunately unemployment spells are very difficult to measure in the HRS, UI receipt 
is captured only every other year, and sample sizes are smaller than in either CPS sample.   
   8 
 
A. March Current Population Survey (CPS) 
The CPS is the leading survey of labor market activity in the United States.  The monthly 
survey asks a sequence of questions about the respondent’s involvement in the labor market 
around the time of survey and also collects demographic data. Importantly, state of residence is 
available, which we use to merge in state-level data on unemployment rates and UI benefits.  In 
March of each year, the “Annual Demographic File” is administered as a supplement to the CPS.  
Respondents are asked about their income in the preceding calendar year from multiple sources, 
including UI, SS, and private pensions.
9  Research has shown that UI receipt measured in this 
way captures 75 to 80 percent of actual UI receipt (Hotz and Sholz, 2002).   
Another important attribute of the Annual Demographic File is that it obtains information 
on the labor market activity of  respondents in  the preceding  calendar  year, including weeks 
worked,  usual  hours  worked  per  week,  and  weeks  spent  looking  for  work.    Combining  this 
retrospective information along with that obtained in the regular monthly survey, we define a 
retirement to occur when an older worker reports being in the labor force in the preceding year, 
but is out of the labor force on the March survey date.  We record workers as experiencing some 
unemployment if they reported looking for work in the past calendar year.
10 
As in Coile and Levine (2006), we focus on workers between the ages of 55 and 69, who 
are more likely to retire in any given year.  Despite the relatively small slice of the population 
that this group represents, the total sample sizes in the March CPS – 130,000 to 215,000 people 
                                                 
9 The Social Security income variable in the CPS includes Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits; 
there is a separate question about disability income, which refers to private disability insurance income only.   
 
10 Our definition perhaps provides a slight understatement of unemployment and UI receipt since those activities 
may have taken place in January or February of year t. 
   9 
per  year,  depending  on  the  year  –  are  large  enough  to  provide  us  with  a  sample  of  many 
thousands of older workers when we pool data from the 1980 through 2004 surveys. 
 
B. Matched March CPS Data 
As just described, the March CPS provides a method of constructing what amounts to a 
two period panel for each respondent.  But the structure of the CPS actually enables one to 
compile a three period panel.  Each respondent is surveyed for four consecutive months, then out 
for  eight  months,  then  back  in  the  sample  for  four  months.    Thus  any  CPS  respondents 
interviewed  in  a  March  as  one  of  their  initial surveys  are  also  interviewed  in  the following 
March.
11  In their second interview, individuals provide contemporaneous information regarding 
their  activity  in  the  survey  week,  period  t,  and  retrospective  information  for  the  preceding 
calendar year, period t-1.  When the same individuals were interviewed one year earlier, they 
provided  contemporaneous  information  for  the  survey  week,  period  t-1,  and  retrospective 
information for the preceding calendar year, period t-2.  Combining this, we have information on 
labor  market  activity  in  three  consecutive  years.    We  define  a  retirement  transition  to  have 
occurred when the individual reports working for 13 or more weeks in period t-2, working for 
less than 13 weeks in period t, and being out of the labor force at time t.  Assuming that weeks 
worked are consecutive starting at the beginning of the calendar year, this amounts to saying that 
individuals are working in March of t-2, not working at March of t-1, and out of the labor force 
at  March  of  t.  Our  definition  thus  requires  respondents  to  have  not  worked  for  at  least  12 
consecutive months to be counted as retired.  
                                                 
11 Because of structural changes in the survey, matches between the 1984 and 1985 surveys as well as the 1994 and 
1995 surveys cannot be conducted.  For simplicity, all charts will provide values for 1985 and 1995 that are the 
averages of the surrounding years.  These data will not be used in any econometric analysis, however.   10 
  In practice, matching responses for an individual across surveys is not perfect.  Because 
the CPS is a household-based survey, there are no person-specific identifiers that would enable 
the researcher to do the match directly.  Moreover, individuals who move are not followed.  The 
basic framework for matching people involves matching household identifiers and then matching 
individuals within the household according to their characteristics.  On average, roughly two-thirds 
of those eligible to be matched actually are matched.
12  Madrian and Lefgren (1999) describe 
alternative methods for conducting the match; we have adopted their preferred method. 
 
C. Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 
The HRS is the premier data set to study aging issues in the U.S.  The HRS began in 
1992 as a longitudinal survey of individuals aged 51 to 61 (born between 1931 and 1941) and 
their spouses, with re-interviews of these 12,652 respondents every two years.  Seven waves of 
the data, covering the years 1992 to 2004, are now available.
13  Starting in 1998, the HRS was 
expanded  to  include  all  birth  cohorts  born  prior  to  1948.    The  HRS  contains  a  wealth  of 
information  on  employment,  health,  assets  and  income,  demographics,  family  structure  and 
transfers, and expectations.  Importantly, the HRS also contains data on state of residence.
14   
As the HRS is conducted biennially, we look at retirement transitions and benefit receipt 
between survey waves.  We define a retirement transition to have occurred when the respondent 
was working at the previous survey wave and retired by the survey date, based on self-reported 
                                                 
12 This potentially creates a sample selection problem because individuals who retire then move will be included 
among the unmatched.  Issues such as this highlight the importance of using different data sets, since the regular 
March CPS and HRS samples are not affected by this problem. 
 
13 Only the preliminary release of 2004 data is available at the current time.  
 
14 Access to these data is restricted to protect respondents’ confidentiality, but we have received permission to 
access the  state identifiers through the National Bureau of Economic  Research (NBER),  which has a  standing 
restricted data agreement with the HRS.   
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labor  force  status.
15    UI  receipt  is  identified  based  on  questions  about  unemployment 
compensation received in the year before the survey (in odd-numbered years).  Our measure 
misses instances of UI receipt that fall entirely within even-numbered years; thus, descriptive 
statistics  and  regression  estimates  are  understated  and  our  results  should  be  interpreted 
accordingly.  SS receipt is identified in a similar manner.  Unfortunately, the HRS is not well-
designed  to  capture  spells  of  unemployment  between  waves;  thus,  we  do  not  conduct  any 
analysis of unemployment using the HRS.
16 
 
D. Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two parts.  The first question we examine is how labor 
market conditions affect retirement.  To assess this, we estimate regressions of the following 
form for our three data sets:  
0 1 2 iast st ist a s t ist retire unemrate X b b b g g g e = + + + + + +           (1) 
In this specification, retire is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i, at age a, living in state s, at time 
t retires and unemratest is the unemployment rate in that state and year.
17  As described earlier, 
each of our data sources capture a retirement transition in a different way.  For the remainder of 
the paper, we ignore those distinctions and simply refer to a retirement transition as a generic 
concept.  In each case, we restrict our analysis to individuals who are in the labor force at time   
t-1 and consider their decision to retire in the current period t.   
                                                 
15 Workers may select multiple labor force status codes.  In our analysis, any individual who identifies himself as 
simultaneously working and retired is treated as working.  Individuals who exit the labor force to disability or 
homemaker status (but do not explicitly label themselves as retired) are also treated as retired. 
 
16 The survey asks about unemployment on the survey date, but has no general question asked of non-working 
respondents about whether the individual spent time looking for work since the previous wave.   
 
17 To measure the labor market conditions facing older workers as accurately as possible, one might like to use an 
age-specific unemployment rate.  Unfortunately, the relatively small sample sizes in the CPS in smaller states do not 
allow for this to be reliably estimated at the state level.    12 
  Here and elsewhere in the model, X represents personal characteristics of the individual 
(race, education, marital status, and the presence of children under age 18), gs represents state-
specific fixed effects, gt represents year-specific fixed effects, and ga represents age-specific fixed 
effects.  These age fixed effects incorporate the different retirement propensities of individuals at 
different ages.  Including them essentially converts this model into a discrete-time proportional 
hazards model of retirement, where the estimated values of ga at each specific age represent the 
baseline hazard.  Models of retirement transitions of this type are estimated in Coile and Levine 
(2006), Coile (2004a, 2004b) and Coile and Gruber (forthcoming).  We estimate our regressions 
as linear probability models, but find results to be quite similar if we use probit models instead.    
  If unemployment acts as a constraint limiting the ability of older workers to remain in the 
labor force, we would expect the b1 coefficient to be positive.  To verify that this coefficient is 
picking  up  a  causal  effect  of  unemployment  on  retirement  transitions,  we  estimate  alternate 
versions of equation (1) where the dependent variable is defined as retirement accompanied by a 
period of unemployment and as retirement with UI receipt.  If a higher unemployment rate raises 
the probability of retirement, then we would expect it to also raise the probability of retiring with 
a period of unemployment and retiring with UI receipt.  Furthermore, to explore whether labor 
market  conditions  affect  the  take-up  of  other  sources  of  retirement  income,  we  estimate 
additional alternative versions of equation (1) where the dependent variable is retirement with SS 
receipt or retirement with receipt of pension income.
18   Finally, for all specifications, we explore 
                                                 
18 Because we cannot directly identify receipt of SSDI income in the CPS, as explained above, we cannot use the 
CPS to explore whether DI receipt is cyclical.  We can identify DI receipt in the HRS and find no evidence that it is 
cyclical, although this may be due in part to small sample sizes.  Interestingly, Duggan et. al. (2006) find that take-
up of the Veterans Affair’s Disability Compensation program is cyclical. 
   13 
whether the effect of labor market conditions on retirement varies by age, by interacting the 
unemployment rate with age group dummies.
19 
  The  second  question  we  address  is  whether  a  more  generous  UI  system  reduces  the 
likelihood of transitions into retirement.  We define the generosity of a state’s UI system along 
two dimensions – the benefit level and ease of meeting monetary eligibility requirements.
20  As 
we described earlier, an older unemployed worker may search longer if that worker is receiving a 
larger UI benefit, which may forestall the decision to retire; if suitable employment can be found, 
that retirement decision may be prolonged even further.  Thus one hypothesis we seek to test is 
the  potential  negative  relationship  between  higher  UI  benefit  levels  and  the  likelihood  of  a 
retirement transition.  In addition, the UI system is more likely to affect retirement transitions if a 
larger share of workers is monetarily eligible for UI benefits, so we test this hypothesis as well.  
  To this end, we estimate models of the form: 
0 1 2 3 log(max ) iast st st st retire weeklybenefit shareeligible unemrate b b b b = + + +    (2) 
    ist t s a ist X e g g g b + + + + + 4          
where maxweeklybenefit is the maximum weekly benefit amount that a UI recipient can collect in 
a particular state/year.  The shareeligiblest variable measures the share of the state’s work force 
                                                 
19  A  broader  life-cycle  model  would  include  kinks  in  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint  introduced  by  the 
availability of retirement benefits at particular ages as well as other program rules, such as the work eligibility 
requirements and benefit formulas for Social Security retired worker and disability insurance benefits.  Estimation of 
such a structural model is beyond the scope of this paper, though we note in the conclusion that a fruitful area for 
future research is to build a retirement model that incorporates the role of labor market constraints along with other 
factors that have been more extensively studied, such as Social Security incentives.   
 
20 Although benefit levels and monetary eligibility rules are probably the most important components of the UI 
program, there are other program provisions that may play a role in retirement transitions.  For instance, beginning 
in  the  mid-1990s,  a  handful  of  states  began  to  offer  a  “self-employment  assistance”  program  that  enables  UI 
recipients  to  receive  UI  benefits  in  a  lump-sum  in  order  to  start  up  a  small  business.    Since  older  workers 
transitioning to retirement may find a period of self-employment desirable, such a program may have relevance for 
them.  Nevertheless, our analysis of these programs found no systematic relationship.  In addition, rules allowing 
workers to collect UI while searching for part-time work only may also enhance the program’s usefulness to some 
older workers.  Unfortunately, our survey of the regulations only turned up documentation on state differences in 
these policies beginning in the mid-1990s.  Before that, we were unable to verify what states had what types of 
policies in this regard.  As a result, we are unable to examine this possibility in our econometric analysis.     
   14 
that satisfies the monetary eligibility requirements for UI benefit receipt at time t.  Since this will 
depend not only on the state’s eligibility rules but also on the characteristics of workers in the 
state, we use a simulated measure of eligibility that is generated by running a common sample of 
individuals through the eligibility rules in each state and year.
21  This approach is useful in that it 
provides a systematic measure of the generosity of a state’s eligibility rules at a point in time and 
is unrelated to the characteristics of the individual.   
  This  model  represents  a  reduced  form  specification  of  a  structural  model  where  the 
retirement rate depends upon the replacement rate than an individual worker receives.  Since an 
individual’s  replacement  rate  is  endogenous  to  his  past  labor  market  activity,  the  maximum 
weekly benefit amount would serve as an appropriate instrumental variable.  This reduced form 
approach is a more parsimonious specification of this relationship that focuses on the plausibly 
exogenous variation in a state-set policy parameter.
22,23 
  There are, of course, other potential sources of bias in this parameter estimate.  Since our 
approach relies on state-specific variability, geographical differences in labor market attributes 
may be related to success in the labor market and to the process of setting maximum benefit 
                                                 
21 Specifically, we use a random sample of 5,000 March CPS respondents from 1979 to 2003 who spent time 
looking for work last year and were unemployed for less than 26 weeks on the survey date (to avoid those that had 
exhausted their benefits).  The mean rate of monetary eligibility for this sample (73%) is based on all unemployed 
workers, not just job losers, whose rate of eligibility would be higher.  See Levine (forthcoming) for details. 
  
22 “Policy endogeneity” is one criticism that is sometimes made in models like this (Besley and Case, 2000).  The 
potential problem is that the state may set its policies in response to labor market conditions, perhaps lowering 
maximum  weekly  benefits  when  unemployment  rates  are  high  to  save  money.    If  retirements  increase  during 
recessions, this would generate a spurious negative relationship between maximum weekly benefits and retirements.  
Although this is a reasonable concern, Levine (forthcoming) shows that states tend to respond to the financial stress 
that a recession places on the UI system by raising taxes rather than by lowering benefits. 
 
23 One can easily imagine that the UI system would be more important for certain workers, such as those who lack 
sufficient work history to qualify for Social Security benefits or who are in poor health.  Unfortunately, the CPS 
lacks the data necessary to pursue these hypotheses.  One could theoretically do so in the HRS, but since our HRS 
estimates are generally much less precise than our CPS estimates due to smaller sample sizes, as we discuss below, 
we feel that pursuing this would be unlikely to generate significant results. 
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amounts.  To the extent that these differences are long-standing in nature, we can account for 
them by including state-fixed effects in our model.  Similarly, national trends over time may be 
related to both retirement patterns as well as the generosity of UI benefits, so we also include 
year-specific  fixed  effects.      Thus,  our  identification  is  based  on  variation  in  the  maximum 
weekly benefit amount within states over time and our key identifying assumption is that such 
changes are exogenous to retirement behavior. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Analysis 
  In this part of the paper we use the alternative datasets at our disposal to describe the roles 
that  unemployment  spells  and  unemployment  insurance  receipt  play  in  retirement  transitions.  
Figure 1 shows the annual retirement hazard for workers age 55 to 69 over the past twenty-five 
years, with shading to indicate the timing of recessions.
24  Overall, the figure shows a recent 
downward  trend  in  retirement.    Any  possible  increase  in  retirement  during  recession  years  is 
swamped by the general downward trend and noise in the year-to-year estimates.  The HRS annual 
retirement rate is somewhat noisier, as may be expected given the smaller sample size.
25   
  Figure 2 examines the relative frequency of various paths to retirement in the March CPS 
by showing the share of retirements that occur  with unemployment,  with UI receipt, with SS 
receipt, and with pension receipt.  The share with SS receipt is quite high, at about 45 percent, and 
would naturally be much higher if we restricted the sample to only those workers age 62 and 
                                                 
24 The definitions of when a recession begins and ends are based on the determination of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research and are based on movements in GDP.  It is common for labor market peaks and troughs to lag 
behind the cyclical movements in GDP. 
 
25 Note that the retirement hazard for the HRS presented in Figure 1 is the annual retirement hazard.  In Table 1 and 
the empirical analysis, retirement is between waves of the survey (over a two-year period), so the mean retirement 
rate is naturally much higher.    16 
above.  As in Figure 1, there is no obvious increase in the frequency of retirement with SS receipt 
during recessions.  This does not rule out the possibility that labor market conditions affect SS 
take-up, however; since the majority of SS take-up is not driven by labor market conditions, any 
such effect would likely be too small to see in the overall data.  The share retiring with pension 
receipt is also fairly high, at 30 percent, and is roughly constant over the period.  The share of 
workers retiring with a spell of unemployment or of UI receipt, by contrast, does display a cyclical 
pattern,  with  the  spikes  often  occurring  just  after  the  official  end  of  the  recession.    Another 
interesting  thing  to  note  from  Figure  2  is  that  twice  as  many  workers  retire  with  a  spell  of 
unemployment, roughly 12 percent over the years, as do with a spell of UI receipt. 
More direct information on the extent to which spells of unemployment are accompanied 
by UI receipt is shown in Table 1.   Approximately 10 to 12 percent of such transitions include a 
spell of unemployment and about 6 to 7 percent include a spell of UI receipt.  It is important to 
note, however, that only 3 to 5 percent of retirements included a spell of unemployment along with 
UI receipt.  This means that a reasonably large number of older workers appear to transition to 
retirement with no unemployment, but still manage to collect UI benefits.  Alternatively, the labor 
market measures available to us over the relevant time window may not be sufficient to capture all 
periods of unemployment.   
The frequency of retirement transitions that involve spells of UI receipt, reported in Table 
1, is lower in the U.S. than in other developed nations, but not dramatically so.  In the U.S., this 
figure is 6 to 7 percent.  This is essentially the same as in Sweden (Palme and Svensson, 2004), 
only slightly lower than in Belgium (Dellis et. al., 2004), and about one-third as large as in 
France and Germany (Mathieu and Blanchet, 2004; Borsch-Supan et. al., 2004).     17 
The lower panel of the table presents comparable statistics for the subsample of workers 
aged 62-65.  Although retirement rates and, particularly, Social Security receipt are higher at these 
ages, the remainder of the results is comparable to those for the full sample of workers age 55-69.
26 
 
B. Empirical Analysis 
  Tables 2A and 2B present the results of estimating equation (1).  The coefficients and 
standard errors shown on the table have been multiplied by 10, so that these numbers reflect the 
effect of a 10 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate.  In our discussion, we focus on 
the effect of a 3 percentage point increase, which corresponds roughly from moving from a period 
of expansion to recession.  All specifications include demographic variables and age, state, and 
time fixed effects, as detailed above.  Our models are estimated as linear probability models. 
   The second row on these tables shows the effect of the unemployment rate on retirement.  
In the March CPS results shown in Column 1 of Table 2A, a 3 percentage point increase raises the 
probability of retirement by .006 percentage points, or 4.6 percent relative to the mean retirement 
rate of 13 percent.  The effect is statistically significant.  The coefficient from the matched March 
CPS in Column 6 is very similar and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level, reflecting the 
smaller sample size in those data.  The coefficient from the HRS in Column 1 of Table 2B is 
somewhat  larger,  indicating  a  13  percent  increase  relative  to  the  mean  retirement  rate,  and  is 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
  To better understand the magnitude of our coefficients, we compare them to estimates from 
previous studies looking at the effect of other factors on retirement.  We find that these estimates 
are fairly similar in magnitude to the effect of moderate changes in financial incentives from SS 
                                                 
26 One discrepancy across data sets is that SS receipt is considerably lower in the March CPS than the other two 
sources of data.  Again, we believe the reason for this is that the definition of “retirement” in the March CPS 
includes transitions for individuals who are less attached to the labor market in the first place.   18 
and pensions.  For example, Coile and Gruber (forthcoming) estimate that a $10,000 increase in SS 
wealth raises the probability of retirement by 4 percent relative to the mean retirement rate and that 
a $1,000 increase in the return to additional work through the SS and pension systems lowers 
retirement by 1 percent.   
Comparing these estimates to the impact of health shocks is complicated by the fact that 
studies examining their impact concentrate on the effect on the individuals experiencing the shock 
rather than the aggregated effect that relies on an increase in the risk of experiencing such a shock.  
The  latter  approach  is  consistent  with  our  analysis  of  labor  market  shocks.    As  a  point  of 
comparison, Coile (2004b) finds that a heart attack, stroke, or new cancer diagnosis raises the 
probability of retirement by 87 percent relative to the mean for men and by 51 percent for women, 
but these events occur for 6.7 percent of men and 5 percent of women over a two year period.  This 
means that the aggregate impact associated with the threat of such a health shock is a 6 percent 
reduction in retirement rates relative to the mean for men and a 3 percent reduction for women.  
These are comparable to our estimates of the impact of a recession.    
  The remaining columns in these tables explore whether a higher unemployment rate is 
associated with a higher probability of retirement accompanied by unemployment, UI receipt, SS 
receipt, and pension receipt.  Columns 2 and 3 (March CPS), Columns 6 and 7 (matched March 
CPS) in Table 2A and Column 2 in Table 2B (HRS) focus on the probability of retirement with 
unemployment and retirement with UI receipt.  We view these specifications as an important way 
to check that our analysis is measuring a causal effect of unemployment on retirement rather than 
some spurious effect.  In each case, the results support our interpretation.  Our coefficient estimates 
are highly  significant  and much larger in magnitude,  relative to the mean probability  of such 
transitions in the sample as a whole, than those reported above.  The remaining columns in these   19 
tables  test  whether  higher  unemployment  results  in  more  transitions  to  retirement  with  SS  or 
pension receipt.  We find positive and generally significant coefficients across the three data sets, 
indicating  that  workers  with  access  to  retirement  benefits  may  use  them  to  help  overcome 
unemployment-related income loss.    
  The lower panel on Tables 2A and 2B allows the effect of the unemployment rate on 
retirement to vary by age by including the unemployment rate as well as interactions between it 
and various age  group dummies (58-60, 61, 62-64, 65-67, and 68-69; implicitly, 55-57 is the 
omitted group).
27  Here we find a striking pattern.  In the general retirement models (Columns 1 
and 6 of Table 2A and Column 1 of Table 2B), the unemployment rate coefficient is insignificant 
in all three data sets, as is the interaction with the age 58-60 dummy.  Starting at age 62, however, 
the  interaction  terms  become  positive  and  significant  in  both  CPS  data  sets.
28    These  results 
indicate  that  the  ability  of  workers  to  respond  to  labor  market  shocks  by  retiring  is  highly 
dependent  on  their  access  to  SS  benefits.    Point  estimates  in  the  HRS  are  similar,  but  more 
imprecisely estimated due to the small sample size.  The remaining columns of the lower panels of 
these tables further confirm that these effects by age are driven by transitions that include a spell of 
unemployment  and  UI  receipt.    Moreover,  retirements  that  include  receipt  of  SS  and  pension 
benefits also rise beginning at age 62 when a recession hits.  All of this evidence suggests that 
workers rely on their ability to access SS when they become eligible for those benefits as a form of 
income support when they lose their jobs. 
                                                 
27 We have also estimated models where the unemployment rate is interacted with single age dummies.  The results 
were analogous to those described here, but somewhat noisier since there are fewer people in each single age cell. 
 
28 There is also some evidence that this effect may begin at age 61.  This may occur because individuals who lose 
their jobs during a recession are able to make do with UI benefits or their own savings for a short time before SS 
benefit eligibility.  Alternatively, this may result from the difficulties in precisely estimating a worker’s age at the time 
of retirement.   20 
  In Table 3, we run regressions separately in the two CPS data sets for men and women and 
by  education  group.    In  our  basic  specification,  we  find  consistently  stronger  effects  of  the 
unemployment rate on retirement for women and for high school graduates.  When we add age 
interactions, it is evident that the unemployment rate affects retirement only starting at age 61 or 62 
for most groups (high school graduates, high school dropouts, men, and women); however, the age 
interactions are too imprecisely measured to draw any strong conclusions about whether these 
effects are larger for one group or another.  
  We  know  from  Tables  2A  and  2B  that  labor  market  constraints  affect  retirement 
transitions,  but  what  role  do  UI  incentives  play?   We  explore  this  question  in  Table  4.    The 
specifications displayed here parallel those on Tables 2A and 2B, except that we add two right 
hand side variables to capture the generosity of the UI system, the log of the maximum weekly UI 
benefit amount and the simulated share of workers eligible for UI.
29  We expect a negative effect of 
UI benefits on retirement, as a more generous UI benefit may lead workers to take-up UI and delay 
onset of retirement and benefit claiming for the duration of UI receipt and also may allow workers 
the time to find a new job, delaying retirement still further.  We also expect a negative effect of the 
share eligible on retirement, as fewer workers may transition to retirement if more of them are 
eligible for UI. 
In the first panel, we fail to find a consistent negative and significant effect of either the UI 
benefit  level  or  share  eligible  for  UI  on  retirement.    When  we  interact  these  measures  of  UI 
generosity  with  age,  we  do  find  the  expected  negative  coefficient  on  these  interaction  terms 
                                                 
29 In keeping with our focus on retirement, we continue to define the dependent variable as a transition to retirement.  
Alternatively, looking at the effect of UI on SS claiming could be of interest because claiming may be considered an 
alternative  retirement  definition  and  because  there  may  be  program  interactions  between  UI  and  SS.  Program 
interactions are an important and understudied area; see Neumark and Powers (2005) and Mitchell and Phillips 
(2000) for two notable exceptions.  We conducted such an analysis, limiting the sample to those age 61 and above 
for whom SS claiming is an option, but failed to find statistically significant effects of UI generosity on claiming.    21 
starting  at  age  62  in  the  two  CPS  data  sets.    However,  these  coefficients  are  sometimes 
insignificant and imply relatively small effects of the UI system on retirement, once the main effect 
is added to the interaction term.  For example, the total effect of a 10 percent increase in the 
maximum weekly benefit amount in the matched March CPS is to lower retirement by .0048, or 
about 2 percent relative to the mean retirement rate in this age group, but the total effect in the 
March CPS and HRS is near zero.  For the share eligible, the total effect at age 62 is negative in 
both the March CPS and matched March CPS, though the age 62 interaction is significant only in 
the former.  Overall, we find weak evidence at best that more generous UI benefits enable older 
workers to delay retirement.
30       
  The  results  in  Table  4  are  somewhat  puzzling  because  past  work  has  found  that  UI 
incentives have played a significant role in explaining take-up rates and unemployment durations.  
Do these incentives matter less for older workers or is the impact on retirement simply different 
than that found for these other behaviors?  To investigate this question, we used the March CPS 
data to estimate models that approximate UI take-up and unemployment duration.  We relate the 
log of the maximum weekly UI benefit in a respondent’s state and year to an indicator of take-up 
(the  likelihood  of  collecting  UI  among  those  who  experience  some  unemployment)  and  an 
indicator of spell duration (weeks spent looking for work in the last calendar year among those 
experiencing some unemployment).
 31  We examine these outcomes for the same sample of 55-69 
                                                 
30 It is plausible that the generosity of the UI system affects retirement transitions more when the unemployment rate 
is higher or when a larger fraction of workers is eligible for benefits.  However, we find no evidence of this when we 
add an interaction between the unemployment rate and the UI benefit level or the share eligible to the model.  
 
31 Past work in this area has been able to identify take-up as the receipt of benefits among UI eligible workers, but 
we do not have access to UI eligibility.  Similarly, duration models have typically taken advantage of data that 
enables the researcher to follow spells of unemployment in a hazard framework, but we do not have data of that 
form either.  We only use the March CPS for this analysis because the matched March data has the same information 
with smaller sample sizes than the regular March CPS data.  The HRS is not appropriate since it does not contain 
much information on unemployment.   22 
year old workers as we have been focusing on, but we also replicate the analysis for workers 
younger than that (age 21-54) to see if there is a difference between age groups. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.  For younger workers, we find that 
benefit generosity and more lenient eligibility rules are both positively associated with UI receipt, 
while only the UI benefit level is positively associated with the duration of unemployment, which 
is all consistent with the previous literature and our expectations.  For older workers, however, the 
effect of both measures of UI generosity on receipt is negative and insignificant, while the effect of 
UI benefit level on duration is positive, significant, and larger than for younger workers.  We 
believe the duration results may be consistent with a story where older workers on UI do not look 
as hard for new jobs as younger workers; for them, UI benefits may be simply a source of income, 
rather than a means to make a better job match.  Regardless, the fact that UI receipt does not seem 
to  be  affected  by  UI  generosity  for  older  workers  is  consistent  with  the  lack  of  a  retirement 
response to such changes. 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
  This study has explored how unemployment affects retirement and whether the UI system 
and access to SS affect workers’ responses to labor market shocks.  We have several principal 
findings.  First, we find that retirement transitions are cyclically sensitive.  The magnitudes of these 
effects are similar to those associated with moderate changes in financial incentives to retire and to 
the threat of a health shock to which older workers are exposed.  Second, although we predicted 
that more generous UI benefits would be associated with a reduced probability of retirement, we 
find no consistent evidence of this.  Finally, we find that SS interacts with labor market conditions 
in affecting retirement transitions, as the effect of the unemployment rate on retirement transitions   23 
appears only as workers near or reach the age of eligibility for SS benefits.  Overall, our findings 
indicate that older workers may rely more on SS than on UI to help them weather labor market 
shocks.  For these workers, the SS system may be a better source of protection against the income 
loss associated with unemployment than the UI system. 
  How do  we  explain our finding that older  workers  respond more to SS than to  UI in 
responding to labor market shocks?  In answering this, it is useful to recall that the UI system has 
two goals, to provide consumption-smoothing benefits for workers facing lost earnings due to 
unemployment and to give workers the means to find a better job match.  The second goal is 
clearly less important for older workers than their younger counterparts, since older workers have 
fewer years to benefit from improved match quality and are less likely have good jobs available to 
them in any event. 
In  terms  of  consumption  smoothing,  SS  may  provide  a  more  attractive  means  of 
accomplishing this than UI.  First, UI benefit receipt is typically limited to 6 months, while SS 
benefits are received until death.  Second, UI benefit receipt involves transactions costs that SS 
does  not,  namely  the  requirement  to  report  search  activity  to  the  UI  office  and  the  stigma 
associated with UI receipt.  Moreover, some workers may be reluctant to apply for UI benefits if 
they have no intention of searching for a new job.  This may help explain why workers may not 
claim UI and  go straight to SS, thereby  passing up the opportunity to  add perhaps $5,000 to 
$10,000 to their lifetime wealth.          
  We believe that the primary contribution of this paper is to raise awareness that labor 
market conditions may be important determinants of retirement transitions along with other factors 
that have previously received more attention in the literature, such as health status, health insurance 
access,  financial  incentives  from  SS  and  private  pensions,  and  couples’  retirement  decision-  24 
making.  Naturally, there may be interactions between these various factors, so that, for example, 
the consequences of job loss for those in poor health may be even greater because new jobs may be 
even harder to  find.   We believe that  exploring these interactions is  a  fruitful area for  future 
research.   
   25 
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Table 1:  Paths to Retirement 
   
March CPS 
Matched  
March CPS  HRS 
   
Ages 55-69 
Retirement Rate  13.0  11.5  19.7 
     % with Unemployment  11.9  11.3  --- 
     % with UI Receipt  6.1  7.3  4.6 
     % with Unemployment and UI  3.3  4.9  --- 
     % with SS Receipt  45.8  61.6  61.7 
     % with Unemployment and SS  4.4  6.0  --- 
     % with Pension Receipt   32.4  37.8  29.6 
     % with Unemployment and Pension  2.7  3.4  --- 
   
Ages 62-65 
Retirement Rate  21.4  19.2  30.2 
     % with Unemployment  9.8  9.7  --- 
     % with UI Receipt  6.0  6.9  4.3 
     % with Unemployment and UI  3.2  4.3  --- 
     % with SS Receipt  64.0  81.6  87.7 
     % with Unemployment and SS  6.4  8.2  --- 
     % with Pension Receipt   36.5  42.9  31.5 
     % with Unemployment and Pension  2.8  3.3  --- 
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Table 2A:  The Role of Labor Market Conditions in Retirement Transitions, CPS Data 
 (standard errors in parentheses) 

































Mean of Dep. Variable 
 
0.130  0.016  0.008  0.060  0.042    0.116  0.013  0.008  0.071  0.044 
Unemployment rate  0.0198  0.0189  0.0091  0.0140  0.0101    0.0208  0.0131  0.0119  0.0182  0.0076 
  (0.0078)  (0.0025)  (0.0018)  (0.0060)  (0.0051)    (0.0122)  (0.0058)  (0.0037)  (0.0086)  (0.0060) 
                       
Number of Obs. 
 
278,641  278,641  278,641  278,641  278,641    82,115  82,115  82,115  82,115  82,115 
Unemployment rate  -0.0001  0.0110  0.0043  -0.0096  -0.0004    -0.0131  0.0042  0.0038  -0.0183  -0.0164 
  (0.0114)  (0.0035)  (0.0023)  (0.0060)  (0.0061)    (0.0124)  (0.0059)  (0.0034)  (0.0084)  (0.0068) 
                       
Unemployment Rate*  0.0099  0.007  0.0068  0.0039  0.0025    0.0063  0.0075  0.0061  0.0027  0.0069 
Age 58-60  (0.0096)  (0.0037)  (0.0019)  (0.0020)  (0.0058)    (0.0097)  (0.0045)  (0.0037)  (0.0046)  (0.0055) 
                       
Unemployment Rate*  0.0508  0.0122  0.0139  0.0153  0.0061    0.0407  0.0089  0.0201  0.0541  0.0395 
Age 61  (0.0119)  (0.0053)  (0.0044)  (0.0052)  (0.0064)    (0.0230)  (0.0073)  (0.0077)  (0.0243)  (0.0201) 
                       
Unemployment Rate*  0.0517  0.0129  0.0132  0.0509  0.0237    0.0584  0.0269  0.0237  0.0706  0.0496 
Age 62-64  (0.0139)  (0.0046)  (0.0028)  (0.0091)  (0.0085)    (0.0187)  (0.0070)  (0.0057)  (0.0184)  (0.0137) 
                       
Unemployment Rate*  0.1010  0.0222  0.0072  0.1107  0.0484    0.1392  0.0082  0.0039  0.1407  0.0734 
Age 65-67  (0.0170)  (0.0056)  (0.0037)  (0.0169)  (0.0129)    (0.0219)  (0.0075)  (0.0072)  (0.0208)  (0.0164) 
                       
Unemployment Rate*  0.0257  -0.0054  -0.0004  0.0377  -0.0003    0.1113  0.0148  0.0074  0.1203  0.0681 
Age 68-69  (0.0245)  (0.0057)  (0.0034)  (0.0258)  (0.0173)    (0.0335)  (0.0111)  (0.0097)  (0.0373)  (0.0268) 
                       
Number of Obs.  278,641  278,641  278,641  278,641  278,641    82,115  82,115  82,115  82,115  82,115 
Notes:  Estimates and standard errors are all multiplied by 10 and are obtained from linear probability models that also include:  race, education, marital status, and the presence of 
children under age 18, along with a full array of state and year dummy variables and age dummy variables for ages 56-69.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
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Table 2B:  The Role of Labor Market Conditions in Retirement Transitions, HRS Data 




Retire with UI 
Receipt 
(2) 







Mean of Dep. Variable 
 
0.197  0.009  0.122  0.058 
Unemployment rate  0.0868  0.0134  0.0357  0.0467 
  (0.0517)  (0.0124)  (0.0423)  (0.0278) 
         
Number of Obs.  22,880 
 
22,880  22,880  22,880 
Unemployment rate  0.0564  0.0087  0.0222  0.0211 
  (0.0553)  (0.0130)  (0.0409)  (0.0284) 
         
Unemployment Rate*  0.0414  -0.0113  -0.0077  0.0357 
Age 58-60  (0.0415)  (0.0085)  (0.0151)  (0.0222) 
         
Unemployment Rate*  -0.0346  0.0192  -0.0111  0.0281 
Age 61  (0.0702)  (0.0228)  (0.0475)  (0.0410) 
         
Unemployment Rate*  0.0891  0.0286  0.0677  0.0885 
Age 62-64  (0.0581)  (0.0132)  (0.0488)  (0.0370) 
         
Unemployment Rate*  0.0421  0.0089  0.0373  -0.0210 
Age 65-67  (0.0853)  (0.0176)  (0.0788)  (0.0547) 
         
Unemployment Rate*  0.0356  0.0081  0.0384  -0.1094 
Age 68-69  (0.1432)  (0.0151)  (0.1389)  (0.0850) 
         
Number of Obs.  22,880  22,880  22,880  22,880 
Notes:  Estimates and standard errors are all multiplied by 10 and are obtained from linear probability models that also include:  
race, education, marital status, and the presence of children under age 18, along with a full array of state and year dummy variables.  
Age dummy variables for ages 56-69 and unemployment rate*age interactions for ages 55-59 and ages 66-69 are also included, but 
are not reported here.  Standard errors are clustered at the person level, since the data include repeated observations on the same 
individuals.   32 
Table 3:  The Role of Labor Market Conditions in Retirement Transitions by Demographic Group, CPS Data 




























Some College + 
(5) 
Mean of Dep. Variable 
 
0.119  0.144  0.163  0.134  0.111    0.089  0.107  0.140  0.102  0.077 
Unemployment rate  0.0087  0.0365  -0.006  0.0410  0.0048    -0.0020  0.0507  -0.0120  0.0324  0.0216 
  (0.0093)  (0.0112)  (0.0142)  (0.0137)  (0.0128)    (0.0120)  (0.0196)  (0.0312)  (0.0222)  (0.0166) 
                       
Number of Obs. 
 
155,578  123,063  62,435  101,672  114,534    45,983  36,132  17,193  30,946  33,976 
Unemployment rate  -0.0244  0.0162  -0.0449  0.0075  -0.0047    -0.0437  0.0283  -0.0537  -0.0073  0.0099 
  (0.0102)  (0.0130)  (0.0170)  (0.0125)  (0.0150)    (0.0133)  (0.0215)  (0.0293)  (0.0245)  (0.0179) 
                       
Unemployment Rate*  0.0097  0.0108  0.0179  0.0167  0.0017    0.0084  0.0042  0.0158  0.0208  -0.0128 
Age 58-60  (0.0126)  (0.0145)  (0.0162)  (0.0160)  (0.0116)    (0.0170)  (0.0252)  (0.0227)  (0.0191)  (0.0154) 
                       
Unemployment Rate*  0.0467  0.0587  0.0847  0.0458  0.0276    0.0574  0.0177  0.0082  0.0270  0.0604 
Age 61  (0.0127)  (0.0241)  (0.0203)  (0.0222)  (0.0224)    (0.0288)  (0.0331)  (0.0450)  (0.0355)  (0.0424) 
                       
Unemployment Rate*  0.0721  0.0214  0.0479  0.0727  0.0147    0.0698  0.0400  0.0547  0.1025  -0.0142 
Age 62-64  (0.0150)  (0.0172)  (0.0248)  (0.0223)  (0.0159)    (0.0199)  (0.0279)  (0.0322)  (0.0325)  (0.0272) 
                       
Unemployment Rate*  0.1087  0.0898  0.1341  0.1203  0.0373    0.1756  0.0888  0.2002  0.1347  0.0763 
Age 65-67  (0.0201)  (0.0251)  (0.0298)  (0.0294)  (0.0288)    (0.0299)  (0.0346)  (0.0371)  (0.0377)  (0.0469) 
                       
Unemployment Rate*  0.0476  -0.0079  0.0484  0.0073  0.0123    0.1263  0.0820  0.1175  0.0597  0.1161 
Age 68-69  (0.0321)  (0.0382)  (0.0573)  (0.0498)  (0.0333)    (0.0533)  (0.0556)  (0.0845)  (0.0598)  (0.0655) 
                       
Number of Obs.  155,578  123,063  62,435  101,672  114,534    45,983  36,132  17,193  30,946  33,976 
Notes:  Estimates and standard errors are all multiplied by 10 and are obtained from linear probability models that also include:  race, education, marital status, and the presence of 
children under age 18, along with a full array of state and year dummy variables and age dummy variables for ages 56-69.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
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Table 4:  The Role of the Unemployment Insurance System in Retirement Transitions 
 (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  March CPS   
Matched March 
CPS    HRS 
Log Max. UI Benefit  0.0194    -0.0068    0.0016 
  (0.0106)    (0.0097)    (0.0460) 
           
Simulated Monetary Eligibility (SME)  0.0057    -0.0210    -0.0002 
  (0.0129)    (0.0277)    (0.0794) 
           
Unemployment Rate  0.0170    0.0213    0.0863 
  (0.0082)    (0.0113)    (0.0535) 
           
Log Max. UI Benefit  0.0345    -0.0007    0.0380 
  (0.0123)    (0.0105)    (0.0498) 
           
Log Max. UI Benefit*Age 58-60  -0.0061    0.0124    -0.0360 
  (0.0073)    (0.0109)    (0.0294) 
           
Log Max. UI Benefit*Age 61  -0.0100    -0.0470    -0.0498 
  (0.0127)    (0.0334)    (0.0489) 
           
Log Max. UI Benefit*Age 62-64  -0.0339    -0.0362    -0.0196 
  (0.0145)    (0.0176)    (0.0379) 
           
Log Max. UI Benefit*Age 65-67  -0.0461    -0.0210    -0.0676 
  (0.0156)    (0.0213)    (0.0516) 
           
Log Max. UI Benefit*Age 68-69  -0.0422    0.0602    -0.0748 
  (0.0230)    (0.0342)    (0.0840) 
           
Simulated Monetary Eligibility (SME)  0.0225    -0.0090    0.0571 
  (0.0185)    (0.0358)    (0.0885) 
           
SME*Age 58-60  -0.0068    0.0140    -0.0919 
  (0.0148)    (0.0313)    (0.0681) 
           
SME*Age 61  -0.0085    0.0056    0.0029 
  (0.0384)    (0.0728)    (0.1130) 
           
SME*Age 62-64  -0.0775    -0.0651    -0.0051 
  (0.0385)    (0.0490)    (0.0875) 
           
SME*Age 65-67  0.0054    -0.0842    -0.4292 
  (0.0461)    (0.0638)    (0.1196) 
           
SME*Age 68-69  -0.0186    0.0896    0.2523 
  (0.0490)    (0.0822)    (0.1933) 
           
Unemployment Rate  0.0172    0.0211    0.0826 
  (0.0082)    (0.0113)    (0.0534) 
Notes:  Estimates are obtained from linear probability models that also include:  the unemployment rate, race, education, marital 
status, and the presence of children under age 18, along with a full array of state and year dummy variables and age dummy variables 
for ages 56-69.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
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Table 5:  The Impact of UI Generosity and Eligibility Rules on  
UI Receipt and Duration of Unemployment, March CPS Data 
 (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
Any UI Receipt in Calendar Year 
 
Weeks Unemployed in Calendar Year 








Log Max UI Benefit  0.064  -0.020  0.096  0.237 
  (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.100) 
         
Simulated Monetary  0.087  -0.119  0.034  0.108 
Eligibility  (0.027)  (0.104)  (0.048)  (0.171) 
 
Number of Obs.  204,502  19,280  204,502  19,280 
Notes:  Estimates are obtained from linear probability models that also include:  the unemployment rate, race, education, marital status, 
and  the  presence  of  children  under  age  18,  along  with  a  full  array  of  state  and  year  dummy  variables  on  a  sample  of  workers 
experiencing some unemployment.  Age dummy variables for ages 56-69 and unemployment rate*age interactions for ages 55-59 and 
ages 66-69 are also included, but are not reported here.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level.   35 

















































March CPS     Matched March CPS    HRS   
notes:  shaded regions represent recessions, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.  Matched March CPS 
data for 1984 and 1994 does not exist; values are interpolated from surrounding years.  36 































































with unemployment     with UI receipt    with SS receipt    with pension receipt   
notes:  shaded regions represent recessions, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
 